Strategic Use of Environmental Information by Asheim, Geir Bjarne
Strategic use of environmental information
Geir B. Asheim∗
March 23, 2010
Abstract
Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a
benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information lead-
ing to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to
such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions
to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the
benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard eco-
nomic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information.
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1 Introduction
The actions of consumers and firms may have external effects that lead to long-lasting
harm to the natural environment. Current economic activity may also reduce the
resource base and thus contribute to unsustainable development.
In order to prevent degradation of environmental quality and to ensure sustain-
able development, strategies that protect the natural environment and the livelihood
of future generations must be implemented. In principle, such implementation can
be achieved in two ways:
(i) Through environmental policies (i.e., by use of Pigovian taxes or other eco-
nomic instruments) designed to make consumers and firms internalize the en-
vironmental costs of their actions, and endow them with bequest motives for
the (natural and man-made) capital stocks they manage.
(ii) Through spread of information about the environmental consequences of the
actions of consumers and firms, given that these agents have an underlying
concern for the protection of the natural environment and the promotion of
sustainable development.
The first method of implementation, e.g., through Pigovian taxes, is transparent,
as it asks consumers and firms to pay the social costs of the external effects that
their actions lead to, without interfering with decision-making in other respects.
On the other hand, information about the future development of the environ-
ment can be highly important for the emergence of moral motivation leading to
environmentally friendly behavior and the formation of the bequest motives needed
to ensure sustainable development. It is likely that individual decision makers will
be more concerned about the environment if there is awareness about possible grave
consequences that lack of such concern will lead to. Hence, one must be open for
the possibility that individuals’ behavior is influenced by information about the ag-
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gregate consequences of their actions. In addition, such information may impact the
political feasibility of the environmental policies mentioned under (i).
The authorities, e.g., an environmental regulatory agency, can partially control
the spread of information on the environmental consequences of actions taken by
consumers and firms. E.g., the authorities may decide to extend funding of research
where preliminary results seem to indicate that environmental consequences are
serious and long-lasting, while terminating programs that downplay the need for
environmental protection. Such selective support for research may even be given a
seemingly plausible justification by appealing to the “precautionary principle”.
Both the extent to which such information is generated and the manner in which
it is presented can influence the actions consumers and firms wish to take, so that
behavior is changed in an environmentally friendly direction. One may conjecture
that a more aggressive informational policy may serve as a substitute for the kind of
environmental instruments that economists normally suggest. In particular, by using
information to influence people’s environmental values and preferences, external
effects may to some extent be internalized with less use of explicit instruments.
However, strategic use of information raises normative questions of the following
type: How can authorities be under democratic control if they use information to
manipulate the interests of their constituency? How can information be trusted if
it is suspected (or known) that information is spread for strategic purposes?
In this paper, I will not address the former question, as I will assume that the
environmental agency is benevolent, seeking to foster the interests of the individuals.
Rather, I will be concerned with the latter question. The present paper will
present modeling designed to show that strategic use of environmental information
may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to
disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. This means that decision
makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able
to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment.
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In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation
on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available
information.
The model, which will be presented in Sections 2 and 3, will be based on the ra-
tionale for morally motivated behavior suggested by Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg
(2003). While voluntary private provision of public goods (Bergstrom, Blume and
Varian, 1986) will be negligible without social preferences, and the “warm glow” the-
ory of giving (Andreoni, 1990) does not specify a connection between actual and ideal
behavior, Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg’s theory suggests that morally motivated
behavior will depend on the behavior individuals believe will maximize social wel-
fare. Therefore, information about the environmental consequences of their behavior
will affect what they decide to do (Owen, Videras and Wu, 2008, present empiri-
cal support for this hypothesis). This in turn creates an incentive for a benevolent
environmental agency to analyze information dissipation strategically.
Proposition 1 of Section 4 provides a condition under which the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium has the property that information reducing the individuals’ moral
motivation will not be disclosed. Proposition 2 of Section 5 shows that such strategic
use of environmental information may reduce welfare, compared to the situation
where the agency commits to a full-disclosure policy. Section 5 also offers a short
discussion of mechanisms which would enable the environmental agency to make
such a commitment. The concluding Section 6 relates the present analysis to the
literature on the crowding-out effect of economic instruments and summarizes the
policy implications of the present results.
Kallbekken, Westskog and Mideksa (2010) also discuss whether spread of nor-
mative information is an efficient policy instrument in the presence of environmental
externalities. Their interesting analysis complements the one presented here.
The analysis of the present paper is not limited to the case of an environmental
agency that receives environmental information. It applies to any benevolent organi-
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zation that appeals to moral motivation in order to induce voluntary contributions.
E.g., the results suggest that blood drives, seeking to generate voluntary donations,
may conceal information that downplay the need for blood.
2 Voluntary public good provision
Consider an economy with n individuals contributing to an environmental public
good. Each of them chooses effort ei, which is individual i’s voluntary contribution.
All individuals are identical, choosing ei from the unit interval. Individual i’s private
consumption is 1− ei and the total provision of the public good is
∑n
j=1ej .
Each individual i’s utility function is given by:
u(ei, e−i; e∗, eˆ) = 1− ei + e∗ ln
(∑n
j=1
ej
)
− a|eˆ− ei| , (1)
where e−i := (e1, . . . , ei−1, ei+1, . . . , en) is the effort profile of the other n − 1 in-
dividuals, and e∗ > 0, eˆ > 0 and a > 0 are three parameters that determine the
function u. Hence, utility is a quasi-logarithmic function of private consumption
and the public good, with a linear loss function capturing the cost of deviating from
the effort level eˆ believed to be socially optimal by the individual and thus the effort
level that drives his/her moral motivation. At the end of Section 4 it will be noted
that the main result of this paper does not depend on this particular specification
of the utility function.
Observe that e∗ is the effort level which maximizes 1− e+ e∗ ln(ne). Hence, e∗
is the effort which, if made by all, would maximize the utility that each individual
derives from private consumption and the public good. In their analysis, Brekke,
Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) assume that the individuals are correctly informed of
the socially optimal effort, so that eˆ = e∗. In this case, e∗ is the effort which, if made
by all, would maximize each individual’s utility even when the moral motivation is
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taken into account:
e∗ = argmaxeu(e, (e, . . . , e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗, e∗) . (2)
I will assume, like Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) do, that moral moti-
vation is not sufficient to ensure that the actual effort of the individuals equals the
socially optimal effort, e∗, even if their beliefs are correct. In the present model this
assumption corresponds to the condition:
a < 1− 1n . (3)
This follows from the equilibrium analysis of Section 4 (cf. (4)) since each individual’s
effort in the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
e = e
∗
(1−a)n < e
∗
if (3) is combined with eˆ = e∗. Hence, then it is indeed the case that voluntary
contributions fall short of the socially optimal level. Rather, the individuals will
trade-off their moral obligation against their personal material gain from shirking.
3 Hard information
I will allow for the possibility that individuals are not perfectly informed of the so-
cially optimal effort. Moreover, I will assume that the environmental agency receives
signals that provide hard information concerning what the socially optimal effort
is. Hard information, a concept introduced in information economics by Grossman
(1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Tirole (1986), means that, if a signal has
been received, the environmental agency can convey the informational content of the
signal to the general public in a credible way. However, the environmental agency
can conceal that a signal has been received, and it cannot credibly demonstrate that
a signal has not been received.
In the present setting one can imagine that the agency is able to spread the
informational content of a received signal through funding research and undertaking
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publicity campaigns, and that independent experts can testify that the publicized
information is true if and only if the signal has actually been received. Thus, if the
information is based on a received signal, individuals can look at the evidence and
convince themselves that the agency has announced correct information.
In general, the environmental agency will receive signals that affect its belief
of e∗ both positively and negatively. However, given the assumption that moral
motivation is not sufficient to ensure that individuals make the socially optimal
effort, it follows that a received signal affecting the belief of e∗ in a positive direction
will be conveyed to the general public, since it will push effort in a welfare-enhancing
direction. Therefore, only signals affecting the belief of e∗ in a negative direction
are of interest for our analysis.
A parsimonious way of modeling an interesting situation is to assume that e∗
can take on only two values: e∗h with probability p and e
∗
` with probability 1 − p,
where e∗` < e
∗
h. One can think of e
∗
h and e
∗
` as two possible states of the environment,
where effort to protect the environment is particulary needed if e∗ = e∗h. If the true
value is e∗` , then the environmental agency receives a signal which can, if the agency
chooses to do so, be credibly conveyed to the general public. If the true value is e∗h,
then the environmental agency does not receive a signal and cannot credibly convey
information to the general public.
Hence, the environmental agency is perfectly informed of e∗. The agency knows
that e∗ equals e∗h if it does not receive the signal and equals e
∗
` if it does receive the
signal. The strategy of the agency specifies what to do if a signal is received. The
strategy s (∈ [0, 1]) signifies that the agency discloses the signal with probability s
if received. Hence, s = 1 means to convey the informational content of the signal
with probability 1, and s = 0 means to conceal receipt of the signal with probability
1. Say that the environmental agency uses information strategically if s = 0. Figure
1 illustrates the game between the environmental agency and the individuals.
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〈Insert Figure 1 about here〉
Individuals have the prior belief that e∗ equals e∗h with probability p and e
∗
`
with probability 1 − p. If the signal is received and disclosed, then the individuals
have received hard information demonstrating that e∗ equals e∗` . If a signal is not
conveyed, then the posterior belief of each individuals depends on his/her conjecture
of the strategy of the agency. In equilibrium, the conjectures of the individuals will
coincide. Denote by r (∈ [0, 1]) the conjecture of the individuals, meaning that the
individuals believe that the agency discloses the signal with probability r if received.
Then the posterior belief q(r) that the individuals assign to e∗h is given by:
q(r) =
p
p+ (1− p)(1− r) .
In particular, if r = 1 so that the individuals believe that the agency always discloses
a received signal, then q(r) = 1, entailing that the individuals are certain that the
environmental state equals e∗h if a signal is not disclosed. On the other hand, if r = 0
so that the individuals believe that the agency never discloses a received signal, then
q(r) = p, entailing that the individuals’ posterior belief is the same as their prior
belief: e∗ equals e∗h with probability p and e
∗
` with probability 1− p.
4 Equilibrium
We face a dynamic game of incomplete information between the environmental
agency and the n individuals, as the agency but not the individuals are informed
of whether a signal is received. Each individual has two information sets, corre-
sponding to whether a signal has been disclosed or not. At both information sets,
the equilibrium belief of each individual is derived from the strategies of the other
players. Hence, it suffices to apply the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In order to determine the set of subgame-perfect equilibria, we first have to cal-
culate the Nash equilibria in the subgame that the individuals play after the agency
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has disclosed a signal. In this subgame where the individuals have received hard
information demonstrating that e∗ equals e∗` , there exist a unique Nash equilibrium
in which each individual i chooses
e` = argmaxeu(e, (e`, . . . , e`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
; e∗` , e
∗
` )
= argmaxe
(
1− e+ e∗` ln
(
e+ (n−1)e
∗
`
(1−a)n
)
− a|e∗` − e|
)
= e
∗
`
(1−a)n .
(4)
If, on the other hand, a signal is not conveyed, then the mutual best reply of the
individuals depends on the conjecture r of the individuals:
e(r) = argmaxe
(
q(r)u(e, (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
; e∗h, e
∗
h)
+ (1− q(r))u(e, (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
; e∗` , e
∗
`)
)
= argmaxe
(
q(r)
(
1− e+ e∗h ln
(
e+ (n−1)e
∗(r)
(1−a)n
)
− a|e∗h − e|
)
+ (1− q(r))
(
1− e+ e∗` ln
(
e+ (n−1)e
∗(r)
(1−a)n
)
− a|e∗` − e|
))
= argmaxe
(
1− e+ e∗(r) ln
(
e+ (n−1)e
∗(r)
(1−a)n
)
− a|e∗(r)− e|
)
= e
∗(r)
(1−a)n ,
where e∗(r) = q(r)e∗h + (1− q(r))e∗` . This conclusion requires that
a ≤ 1− e∗hne∗` (5)
so that e∗(r)/(1− a)n ≤ e∗` for all r ∈ [0, 1].
We then turn to the behavior of the environmental agency. The agency is benev-
olent, entailing that it wants to maximize the welfare of the individuals. In its eval-
uation of welfare, it will take into account both the actual state of the environment
since this matters for the material well-being of the individuals, and the effect of
the believed state of the environment since this drives the moral motivation of the
individuals.
The environmental agency makes a decision only if a signal has been received,
entailing that that the environmental state equals e∗` . If it discloses the signal, then
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ex post welfare equals:
ud` = u(e`, (e`, . . . , e`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
` ) = 1− e
∗
`
(1−a)n + e
∗
` ln
e∗`
1−a − a · e∗`
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
. (6)
If, on the other hand, the signal is not conveyed, then ex post welfare depends on r:
u`(r) = q(r)u(e(r), (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
h)
+ (1− q(r))u(e(r), (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
`)
= 1− e∗(r)(1−a)n + e∗` ln e
∗(r)
1−a − a · e∗(r)
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
.
(7)
The choice of the environmental agency depends on whether u`(r) exceeds ud` .
If u`(r) > ud` for all r ∈ [0, 1], then the agency will not disclose the signal for
any conjecture of the individual. Hence, then the agency chooses s = 0, and in
equilibrium the conjecture of the individuals will be correct, so that r = 0.
Proposition 1 Assume that u`(r) > ud` for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the environmental regulatory agency
uses information strategically, disclosing with probability 0 hard information showing
that the environmental state is e∗` .
Proof. Assume that the conjecture of the individuals equals r. The payoff of
the agency conditional on the signal being received equals
sud` + (1− s)u`(r) .
Hence, if u`(r) > ud` for all r ∈ [0, 1], then the agency will choose s = 0 independently
of the conjecture r of the individuals. Therefore, r = 0, implying that the individuals
will choose e` if a signal is disclosed, and e(0) if a signal is not conveyed.
As the following corollary shows,
a ≤ e∗`e∗h −
1
n (8)
is a sufficient condition for u`(r) > ud` for all r ∈ [0, 1].
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Corollary 1 Assume that utility function is specified by (1) and satisfies (8). Then
there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the environmental regu-
latory agency uses information strategically, disclosing with probability 0 hard infor-
mation showing that the environmental state is e∗` .
Proof. First, note that (8) implies (5), implying that e(r) is indeed the mutual
best reply for the individuals, given that their conjecture is r. We have that
u`(r)− ud` = − e
∗(r)−e∗`
(1−a)n + e
∗
` ln
e∗(r)
e∗`
− a (e∗(r)− e∗` )
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
.
By Proposition 1, it suffices to show that this expression is positive for all r ∈ [0, 1].
Define f : [e∗` , e
∗
h]→ R by
f(x) = − x−e∗`(1−a)n + e∗` ln xe∗` − a (x− e
∗
` )
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
.
Since
u`(r)− ud` =
∫ e∗(r)
e∗`
f ′(x)dx ,
it is sufficient to show that f ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (e∗` , e∗h). This follows as
f ′(x) = − 1(1−a)n +
e∗`
x − a ·
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
= e
∗
`
x − a− 1n >
e∗`
e∗h
− a− 1n ≥ 0 ,
where x < e∗h implies the strict inequality and (8) implies the weak inequality.
It is of interest to note the relationship between the weak inequality (8), the
sufficient condition for strategic use environmental information, and the strict in-
equality (3), the condition under which moral motivation is not sufficient to ensure
that the actual effort of the individuals equals the socially optimal level. Since
e∗`
e∗h
− 1n < 1− 1n ,
it follows that (8) implies (3). Hence, environmental information will be used strate-
gically when moral motivation falls well short of what is needed for individuals to
act according to their ideal, had they known it.
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The result of Proposition 1 does not depend on the particular utility function
specified in (1). It is sufficient that the utility function u(ei, e−i; e∗, eˆ) satisfies (2)
and that u`(r) > ud` for all r ∈ [0, 1], where
ud` = u(e`, (e`, . . . , e`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
`)
with e` = argmaxeu(e, (e`, . . . , e`); e∗` , e
∗
`), and
u`(r) = q(r)u(e(r), (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
h) + (1− q(r))u(e(r), (e(r), . . . , e(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
`)
with e(r) = argmaxe(q(r)u(e, (e(r), . . . , e(r)); e∗h, e
∗
h)+(1−q(r))u(e, (e(r), . . . , e(r));
e∗` , e
∗
`)). The condition that u`(r) > u
d
` for all r ∈ [0, 1] entails that moral motivation
is not sufficient to ensure that the actual effort of the individuals equals the socially
optimal level, in that same way as (8) implies (3) in the special case that we have
considered, of voluntary contribution to an environmental public good.
5 Welfare analysis
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the individuals do not obtain information
that will enable them to update their prior belief since the agency uses and is believed
to use information strategically. Hence, ex ante welfare equals
u(0) = pu(e(0), (e(0), . . . , e(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗h, e
∗
h) + (1− p)u(e(0), (e(0), . . . , e(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
` ) .
If, on the other hand, the agency had always disclosed a received signal and the
individuals had believed that a received signal would always be conveyed, then ex
ante welfare would have been
u(1) = pu(e(1), (e(1), . . . , e(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗h, e
∗
h) + (1− p)u(e`, (e`, . . . , e`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
` ) .
Proposition 2 Assume that utility function is specified by (1) and satisfies (8).
Then ex ante welfare u(0) in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium with strategic
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use of environmental information is lower than ex ante welfare u(1) in the case
where the environmental agency had disclosed, and had been believed to disclose,
with probability 1 hard information showing that the environmental state is e∗` .
Proof. By using (6) and (7) and the definitions of q(r) and e∗(r), it follows that
u(1) = 1− e∗(0)(1−a)n + pe∗h ln
e∗h
1−a + (1− p)e∗` ln
e∗`
1−a − a · e∗(0)
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
,
u(0) = 1− e∗(0)(1−a)n + e∗(0) ln e
∗(0)
1−a − a · e∗(0)
(
1− 1(1−a)n
)
.
Hence, using that e∗(0) = pe∗h + (1− p)e∗` , we obtain
u(1)− u(0) = pe∗h ln e∗h + (1− p)e∗` ln e∗` − e∗(0) ln e∗(0) .
The fact that e ln e is a strictly convex function implies that u(1)− u(0) > 0.
Proposition 2 entails that there is an informational cost — over and beyond the
fact that moral motivation is insufficient to induce the optimal effort — of trying to
internalize externalities without use of explicit economic instruments. Since infor-
mation will be strategically concealed, even though the agency is benevolent with
aligned interests, the individuals will not have access to all information, implying
that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the
state of the environment.
The above analysis models the interaction between the environmental agency
and the individuals as a one-time interaction. If the agency and the individuals
have an on-going relationship, then one must also consider reputational effects. In
such a situation it is in the interest of the benevolent agency to build up a reputation
for disclosing all information. In the case where the agency faces a small probability
of detection if a received signal is concealed, it may choose to convey the signal due
to the threat of losing its reputation as a trustworthy agency if it does not.
In line with the arguments for rules rather than discretion (Kydland and Prescott,
1977) in the context of monetary policy (see also Helm, Hepburn and Mash, 2003,
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for a discussion in the context of environmental policy), one may use the current
analysis as a basis for proposing that an environmental agency, like a central bank,
should be independent. Exploiting this analogy further (with reference to Rogoff,
1985), one may argue that the environmental agency should be headed by a direc-
tor who cares less about the environmental public good than the individuals. In
particular, suppose that the director’s utility function is given by
1− e+ e
∗
(1− a)nne ,
where e is the effort of each individual. Hence, compared to (1) he discounts the
public good by the factor 1/(1 − a)n (< 1 by (3)) and does not care about the
cost imposed on the individuals by not acting according to their moral motivation.
Then the individuals will act optimally in the director’s evaluation if they are fully
informed. Thus, he will direct the agency to convey the signal whenever it is received.
Even though such institutional arrangements might remove the welfare costs
associated with strategic use of environmental information, it will not remove the
welfare costs that the insufficient moral motivation leads to. If instead the environ-
mental agency has access to and is allowed to use perfect economic instruments, then
optimal effort can be induced in each environmental state and similar informational
problems will not be present. The agency will use instruments leading the optimal
effort of e∗h if the signal is not received and to the optimal effort of e
∗
` if the signal
is received. The individuals will realize that the agency has no reason to conceal
information, given that there is no wedge between what individuals ideally should
do and what they actually do. For the same reason, individuals will not feel a cost
associated with not fulfilling their moral motivation. Hence, the ex ante welfare
under the assumption that perfect economic instruments are used will be:
pu(e∗h, (e
∗
h, . . . , e
∗
h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗h, e
∗
h) + (1− p)u(e∗` , (e∗` , . . . , e∗`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
, e∗` , e
∗
`) .
In this regulatory regime, optimal effort will be induced and all available information
will be utilized.
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6 Concluding remarks
The results of the present paper relates to a line of literature that has developed
during the last few years, relating to whether economic instruments crowd out other
motivation for socially beneficial activity (see Nyborg and Rege, 2003, for a survey
of this literature). Such theoretical analysis and related empirical evidence point to
a cost of using economic instruments, since it weakens the intrinsic motivation that
would otherwise guide people’s actions. Does this mean that we should not apply
economic instruments, and instead base environmental policy on the promotion of
intrinsic motivation?
This paper has developed one argument against this view, namely that promo-
tion of intrinsic motivation may deter disclosure of information on the environmental
effects of economic behavior. This will in turn foster a public view that an environ-
mental agency will only disclose information which proves that behavior has serious
environmental effects, while not making available information showing the opposite.
The analysis has shown that a benevolent environmental agency may indeed choose
to behave in this manner if asked to base environmental policy on the promotion of
intrinsic motivation, but will not do so when instructed to use economic instruments
that can ensure efficient behavior.
Clear policy prescriptions follow from the model of the current paper. If perfect
economic instruments are available, then they should be used, as they lead to op-
timal effort and ensure that all available environmental information is conveyed. If
such instruments are not available and moral motivation is insufficient to induce op-
timal effort, then a benevolent environmental agency will ex post be tempted to use
environmental information strategically which, however, from an ex ante perspec-
tive reduces welfare. Hence, the second-best policy prescription if perfect economic
instruments cannot be used is to design institutional arrangements that will enable
the environmental agency to maintain a reputation for disclosing all information.
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Figure 1: The game between the environmental agency and the individuals.
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